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Aporetic Nietzsche and the Klossowski's proposal. Abstract

Currently, when the need to overcome logocentric metaphysics has become necessity in the many philosophical trends, the role of the German philosopher seems particularly important. The Friedrich Nietzsche's project is full of contradictions; in addition to statements denouncing the cultural heritage of the West, it has also positive theses, which cannot be agreed with the work of a "suspicious investigator". These are: the affirmation of the world postulates and the concept of new values, in relation to the phenomenon of life. In the article contradictions of concepts "will to power" and "superman" are showed, next I propose the different reading of Nietzsche's work with reference to Pierre Klossowski's thought. Therefore the main purposes of my text is to show aporias of Nietzsche's ideas and to outline its post-structuralist interpretation made by Klossowski.

Aporetic Nietzsche and the Klossowski's proposal*

Nietzsche has said everything
and the opposite of everything¹.

I. Introductory remarks

Friedrich Nietzsche's output is an attempt to formulate radical axiological changes on the basis of critical assessment of culture and just because of this radicalism it can arouse some controversy. Especially today, when the need to overcome logocentric metaphysics has become even trivial on the basis of many trends, the role of the German philosopher, who can be called one of the fathers of

* Artykuł powstał w ramach realizacji projektu badawczego nr NN101135040 (grant habilitacyjny MNiSW pt. „Dyskurs podmiotu. Podmiot dyskursu. Przemiany we francuskim poststrukturalizmie”, czas realizacji maj 2011 — maj 2013).

¹ Colli, G (1994), *Po Nietzschem*, trans. Kasprzysiak S., Kraków, p. 143.

post-structuralism, seems particularly important. Philosophical sympathy of those focusing on displaying the post-structuralism category of difference towards Nietzsche arises from the fact that the German philosopher's project not incidentally is full of contradictions; in addition to statements denouncing the cultural heritage of the West, it has also positive theses, which cannot be agreed with the work of a "suspicious investigator". These are: the affirmation of the world postulates and the concept of new values, "adequate" to the phenomenon of life.

Nietzschean duality is also the reason for more "classic" gestures. They focus on the rejection by some researchers of one (usually "affirmative") from parts of Nietzsche's philosophy. For example: "Diagnosis — yes, therapy — not" by Karl Schlechta ². Because it is so ambiguous, this project inspires consecutive numbers of thinkers, each of them tendentiously selecting some threads, interprets the Nietzschean work for their own use, according to their understanding of philosophical problems. Thus, in many ways interpreted work of the author of *The Twilight of the Idols* often seems a paradoxical consequence of the Nietzschean project itself ³. It appears that Nietzsche can be: a crypto-Christian (Jaspers, Michalski ⁴), apologist for absolute power and the spiritual father of Nazism (Bäumler ⁵), the last metaphysician (Heidegger ⁶), the greatest (and the only true?) hermeneutic (Markowski ⁷), anti-

² Comp. Paweł Kłoczowski's words, *Nietzsche baptized? Tadeusz Gadacz, Piotr Graczyk and Piotr Kłoczowski talk about a book „Płomień wieczności. Eseje o myślach Fryderyka Nietzschego” with its author Krzysztof Michalski, „Znak” 607/2007.*

³ Helmut Gillner (1995) wrote: „Consciously chosen by Nietzsche method of philosophing and his writing style have brought unprecedented multiplicity of interpretations that contradict each other, but with equal right refer to the writings of the philosopher”, Gillner H., *Fryderyk Nietzsche. Filozoficzna i społeczna doktryna immoralizmu*, Warszawa, p. 9.

⁴ Comp. Jaspers, K. (1997), *Nietzsche. An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, trans. Schmitz F. J., Wallraff C. F., Baltimore 1997 and Michalski, K., *Płomień wieczności. Eseje o myślach Fryderyka Nietzschego*, Warszawa.

⁵ Comp. Bäumler, A. (1931), *Nietzsches Philosophie in Selbstzeugnissen*, Leipzig.

⁶ Comp. Heidegger, M. (1991), *Nietzsche*, v. I, II, trans. Krell D. F., San Francisco.

⁷ Comp. Markowski, M. P. (1991), *Nietzsche. Filozofia interpretacji*, Kraków.

metaphysician and eulogist of free creativity (Deleuze, Foucault ⁸) and, finally, someone whose texts should not be treated quite seriously, because the project is a “philosophical misunderstanding” (Żelazny ⁹).

The purpose of this article is to show the aporia of Nietzschean philosophy and outline its poststructuralist interpretation, made by Pierre Klossowski.

II. Aporias. The value of the will to power. Freedom of superman

One of the main slogans of Nietzscheanism is the revaluation of values postulate. It is associated with genealogical unmasking of morality based on compassion and a sense of equality or, as Nietzsche defines: slave righteousness. From *The Antichrist* and *The Genealogy of Morals* we learn that moral values (good and evil) do not exist otherwise than as an “interpretation of phenomena.” They are therefore the interpretation, which as a result of favorable circumstances (and in fact thanks to efficiency), has become widely binding. Because this reactive force of the weak resulted in the precepts of charity, which were to protect the weak against the power of the stronger, dominating also inner motivations of the so-called the masters. The weak imposed their own sense of right (Platonic — Judeo — Christian) upon the strong not only because they wanted to defend themselves. They did it mainly out of revenge, hatred for those whose proceedings they were not able to follow. Therefore, Nietzsche wrote: “The Jews, that priestly people, who knew how to get final satisfaction from their enemies and conquerors (...)” ¹⁰ Even before Freud, Nietzsche appeared to rationalize the mechanism of unconscious desires (envy, revenge), which are perceived as a positive experience at the level of conscious (compassion, concern for the good). Nietzsche is not just about resisting the herd and the visibility of creative individualism in the valuation, the point is that values should serve the creative life and strengthen it effectively (although individualism assumes, of course, the power of opposing what is

⁸ Comp. Deleuze, G. (2003), *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, London, and Pieniążek, P., *Subwersywne społecznictwo: Foucault/Nietzsche*, [<http://www.filozof.uni.lodz.pl/hybris/pdf/Pieniazek%202.pdf>].

⁹ Comp. Żelazny, M. (2007), *Nietzsche. „Ten wielki wzgardziciel”*, Toruń.

¹⁰ Nietzsche, F. (1996), *On The Genealogy of Morals. A Polemical Tract*, trans. Smith D., Oxford, p. 42–43.

existing). The individualist's discomfort involving feeling of ubiquity of slavery morality (it suppresses them even from the centre) does not only depend on the determinants of slave universalistic morality of violence, but also on the fact that this reactive morality harms the development of life and is simply wrong. It is so especially when the truth will lead to unmasking of all values, as grounded in a "real" being, and when existing morality no longer serves life.

Contradiction on the values inherent in the philosophical project of the author of *The Will to Power* takes place between perspectivism, caused by unmasking of absolute values, and a critique of the slavery moral interpretation, as the morals inadequate to the truth and values of being. Does unmasking of the morality of the weak take place in the name of the will to power, which "demands" (in the person of Nietzsche or by that person) some support? Why, then, should it be criticized, implicitly referring to another, also non-obvious value?

The case is not simple and it seems that Martin Heidegger ¹¹, who considered Nietzsche the last metaphysician (a metaphysical foundation is the will to power) and tried in this way to force Nietzsche to give binding answers to these questions. You cannot criticize the morality of slavery in the name of intensification the will to power, if it has not already been accepted that the will to power is a dominant value, not just a sensed state of affairs. Recognition of the existence of the will to power is, incidentally, equally problematic, because it is a metaphysical thesis, and since metaphysical it assumes valuation. Similar difficulty (elevating of the master as potentially blessed with more power than a slave "just a virus") in Nietzsche's concept was pointed by Agata Bielik-Robson: "on the basis of the same nature, which produced of itself highly effective slave revolt, there is no way to prove the superiority of these <<master animals>>. (...) Here Nietzsche — and then, unfortunately, the Nazis — apparently wants to improve the nature against itself [and it shows — B. Ch.] a radical inability of a man to adopt a consistently literalistic attitude, not adding anything, no illusion, to what just exists." ¹² Of course, Nietzsche was well aware that life is always a

¹¹ Comp. Heidegger, M. (1991), *Nietzsche...*

¹² Bielik-Robson, A. (2008), „*Na pustyni*”. *Kryptoteologie późnej nowoczesności*, Kraków, p. 325.

certain way of evaluation, but it does not defend him against charges of “inverted Platonism” (Heidegger). Valuation, i.e. the recognition of the slave morality as a poor one, must be based on something.

Nietzsche repeatedly (especially in his later writings) discusses the problem of values: “The general idea: the ambiguous nature of our modern world — namely, the same symptoms — could be a sign of decline and strength. (...) In one word: a feeling, as a feeling of worth does not stand at a height of time.”¹³ On the other hand, Nietzsche believes that life is based solely on valuation, or interpretation. Cultural phenomena are judged by him as favorable or unfavorable to the growth of the power of life. Therefore he estimates them on the basis of inner intuition, assuming that he, as acting “life” is “infallible”¹⁴. Moreover, even if he permits fallacy of assessments, the reason for evaluation and calling for change remains irrefutable, namely the recognition of the will to power per se. Hence, the condemnation of the morality of the weak is a matter of arbitrary decision on the fact that the Judeo-Christian values weaken life. Besides, if we assume that this argument is well founded, there still remains a problem of the absolute value of will to power, in the name of which the criticism is done. Even when the interpretation of morality is carried out by Nietzsche in the context of the question “for whom?”, he assumes the superiority of the action over the reaction, or the power over the weakness of life.

It seems that the assessment of some perspective as an incorrect raises the question to the evaluating it philosopher, who celebrates life. “If the life interprets, cannot the life be mistaken?”¹⁵ The question is the slave question (because it remains within the opposition good — evil, true — false). However, it seems necessary not only because of the possibility of adopting in the name of life every, even malicious

¹³ Nietzsche, F. (1996), *The Will to Power*, trans. Kaufmann W., Hollingdale R. J., Maryland, p. 76.

¹⁴ Comp. Gillner, H. (1995), *Fryderyk Nietzsche...*, p. 171. It seems that Nietzsche accepts some measure of evaluation, and it consists in the rejection of what tends to unity, stability, sens: “[?]The stronger the striving towards unity, the more confidently you can conclude about weakness, the stronger the desire for variety, diversity, internal decay — the more the force”, Nietzsche, *ibidem*.

¹⁵ Tadeusz Gadacz words [in:] *Nietzsche baptized?...*, p. 11.

interpretation, but especially when trying to prove the need of reevaluation of values. Hence it is primarily to justify the motive of changing the old way of evaluation.

You can assume that the position of Nietzsche, like many other philosophers of suspicion, permits criticism of axiology, if you take into account the notion of supreme good. Charles Taylor characterized systems of Enlightenment as follows “they refer to certain goods not recognizing them at the same time,” and continued: “they feed on intuitions common in our culture (...), for which they would not confer a legitimate place”¹⁶.

Bogdan Baran wrote about perspectivism and the idea of pluralism: “Barrenness lies here in that ideology of pluralism stops where philosophy begins with the question — what and why to choose.”¹⁷ It seems that perspectivism and pluralism of values attributed to Nietzsche in order to demonstrate the consistency of this whole idea, just by its “barrenness” preclude any assessment of the interpretation.¹⁸ Hence the problem: if in fact the values are not absolute and depend on us and our choices, then where from does Nietzsche get inner sense of courage, virtue, or power, which must be invoked to select the appropriate, meaning adequate with respect of life, solutions? Perspectivism clears the field, but does not create a basis for work supporting the value of life. So, why is it better to create (choose creative life), than to die or surrender to expectations of herd morality? After all, such a decision is not understandable by itself.

But do we have a choice? The disbelief in free choice of an individual in Nietzsche has been expressed by Paweł Pieniążek: “But does not self-control [freedom of will — B.Ch.] assume any mediating right, value, purpose, due to which it is made, and which implies figuring it to oneself and presenting?”¹⁹ Therefore, the author excludes reconciliation of the purposeless will to power with the previous recognition

¹⁶ Taylor, Ch. (1997), *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*, Harvard, p. 627–628.

¹⁷ Baran, B. (1997), *Postnietzsche*, Kraków, p. 212.

¹⁸ Comp. Łojek, S. (2008), *Od genealogii moralności do moralnego wychowania. Nietzschego poszukiwania cnoty*, „Diametros” 18/2008.

¹⁹ Pieniążek, P. (1969), *Rozum i szaleństwo. Nowe francuskie interpretacje myśli Nietzschego*, [in:] Klossowski, P., *Nietzsche i błędne koło*, Warszawa, p. 17.

it as a value, and thus excludes the impact of aesthetic preferences on the choice of such, and not other way of life (e.g. such as subordinated to the will to power).

All these doubts, which gives the concept of values are not averted, but deepened, especially when we concern Nietzsche's superman project. The "flaxen beast" is a certain "exemplar"²⁰ and prophecy at the same time. Not any superior man, but ahistorical superman, in whose soul the active forces prevail over reactive. This is the entity endowed with power. Nietzsche's work oscillates between predicting the future and describing a certain stage, which the human condition (or at least some people) is aimed at, and incitement to accelerate the arrival of such state, by creating suitable conditions for breeding a new "race."

In view of the superman concept the following questions arise. Firstly, how does a superior man become a superman? Does this process occur spontaneously, or some individual decision is needed to cross their own species and history? Nietzschean critique of the subject and the theory of free will assigned to the subject (the thesis of free will is the beginning of metaphysical error²¹) indicates rather the first possibility²². Therefore, the transformation is to be done regardless of our intentions. Nihilism appears here more as a kind of a measure of life. The one to survive, as Gilles Deleuze says, to "break the history off" and start new life as a legislator is someone who is strong enough to survive.

However, if such an approach is correct, then why lay aesthetic claims to change the status quo? In other words, why is the beast to be blond, not bald or red

²⁰ Comp. Baran, B. (1997), *Postnietzsche...*, p. 127.

²¹ Comp. Morszczyński, W. (1992), *Nihilistyczna destrukcja myśli wartościującej. Heideggera interpretacja filozofii Nietzschego*, Katowice, p. 81–85.

²² According to Deleuze, Nietzsche: "unmasks <<the soul>>, <<self>>, <<egoism>>, as the lasts hideouts of atomism", the existence of "self" is connected with intersubjectivity, that is morality of herd, which is to overcome by revaluation of values, comp. Deleuze, G. (2003), *Nietzsche and philosophy...*, p. 12.

(as ironically asked Mirosław Żelazny)²³, and do not “aristocratic” Nietzsche’s longing²⁴ then look like “a flower [added] to the gray sheepskin coat of nature”²⁵?

However, since the “flaxen beast” becomes itself by virtue of its decision (and there are commentators, who accept that interpretation not without a reason), so how (for what) does this transformation happen? The genealogy of morals and critique of metaphysics, which promise (as poststructuralists would say) free play, do not determine yet the desire to participate in the game. The difficulties indicated here were pointed out by Stanisław Łojek, when he wrote about the possibility of realization Nietzsche’s ideal on the postmodern basis: “They seem to say [Rorty and Vattimo — B. Ch.] just mere realization that our claims to the «other» world are groundless will restrain the desire for it, the desire for truth will give way to the desire for «false».”²⁶ Nevertheless, a moment later Łojek states that criticism of the concept of truth “only shows us that we placed objects of our worship in imaginary world, it does not say why we would crave for the world which is negation of «this» reality.”²⁷ Only, as he continues, experiencing the consequences of nihilism leading to a “shock” will cause such a fundamental change that a human will become someone else: the one “who they are”²⁸. But it is hard to defend the thesis that an individual has an impact on this post-nihilistic experience, which could result in a radical break up with the past.

²³ Comp. Żelazny, M. (2007), *Nietzsche. „Ten wielki wzgardziciel”...*, p. 207.

²⁴ „Nietzschean <<separated individual>> reveals many similarities to *megapsychos* (a *magnanimous man*), described by Aristotle in the third chapter of the fourth volume of *Ethica Nicomachea*. Having an ethical courage entitles <<a magnanimous man>> to a proud sense of superiority over others and a reasonable expectation that others will recognize and appreciate adequately this ethical superiority”, Łojek S. (2008), *Od genealogii moralności do moralnego wychowania...*, p. 53.

²⁵ Bielik-Robson, A. (2008), *„Na pustyni”...*, p. 325.

²⁶ Łojek, S. (2002), *Obrona Nietzschego. Rzecz o odpowiedzialności*, Kraków, p. 166.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ As Żelazny put aptly a similar problem: “You cannot love anyone, especially yourself, by the power of order or instruction. If it were possible, work of a modern psychological therapist would not be necessary (...”, Żelazny, M. (2007), *Nietzsche. „Ten wielki wzgardziciel”...*, p. 205. Unless it was a categorical imperative, like “you have to love yourself”, then not loving ourselves would at least give rise to a feeling of guilt...

Therefore, if life is the will to power, the superman must be deprived of freedom of choice, even between life and death (freedom from rules also lies in the fact that you can be or cease to exist). Otherwise, nihilism could lead every individual to indifference to these issues. So the “choice” of life is a little like Calvinist theory of grace, as it is done with the “quantum of power” given to the superman by fate and does not depend on him. So, Nietzsche wrote: “The premise of knightly-aristocratic value judgments is a strong body, flourishing, inexhaustible, glowing with health”²⁹, while in another place he wrote about a ship, which “goes with the flow, in which he fell accidentally (...) there it just «wants», because there it has to be.”³⁰

It is worth to recall two examples of how more consistent theoretically (which does not mean quite consistent) philosophical attempts to define human condition after nihilism might look like. In Jacques Lacan’s concept unmasking both products of symbolic order and the symbolic order itself is associated with a new, free from rules prospect of being “rubbish” of the world. A (Non)human being “belched” (spittle), devoid of meaning for itself, without a target moves in a “vacuum in the faith”, and if it dies voluntarily (makes a non-life choice), it is only because of refusal to participate in order of signs.³¹ This way of reasoning is inasmuch consistent after-nihilistic entity remains, freed from meanings, the very element of nature and can only rely on the strength of its own, absolutely incomprehensible desire. No demands for change, no (almost) truths, except presentiment of mortal chaos inevitability. It seems that life is not a fundamental value and can easily be sacrificed for incomprehensible libido claims, as Slavoj Žižek says: only when we succumb to what excites us, “when we are determined to take the risk, we are really alive.”³²

The proposal of Bielik-Robson is opposed to Lacanian. The concept, inspired by Judaism, at the beginning puts the highest value — the value of life itself. Such a

²⁹ Nietzsche, F. (1996), *On the Genealogy of Morals...*, p. 41.

³⁰ Nietzsche, F. (2001), *Nietzsche: The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Williams B. A. O., Cambridge, p. 327.

³¹ Comp. Zupančić, A. (2000), *Ethics of the Real. Kant, Lacan*, Londo[?]n .

³² Žižek, S. (2006), *Kukła i karzeł. Perwersyjny rdzeń chrześcijaństwa*, trans. Kropiwnicki A., Wrocław, p. 130.

perspective is not indeed strange to Nietzsche. Confirming this, the author cites a passage from *Genealogy of Morals* devoted to a Jewish priest: “«No», which a man says to the life, reveals, as if by enchantment, the fullness of the more delicate «Yes»; indeed, if this master of destruction, self-destruction, hurts himself, then the wound forces him to live.”³³ The entity that has overcome nihilism is called by Bielik-Robson (after Harold Bloom) a limping Jacob. It is an individual devoid of aesthetic Greek “aristocratic” nature, for whom the imperative inoculated by Yahweh is “live at any price.” Recognition of this is acquired, as I understand, by some kind of anamnesis, or intuitive insight. The aim of this entity is to defend itself against chaos, to resist with all forces Dionysian ecstasy of “para-mythical blond beast” as long as possible. Why? Because life is a value that absolutely must be preserved. Consistency of this position is the fundamental value of individual life, which makes follow a specific order: to rebel against the “eternally recurring”, chaotic processes of nature.³⁴

Nietzsche's concept can be characterized as an inconsistent intermediate point between those two. On the one hand, Nietzsche is close to, associated with the unmasking nihilistic, aristocratic contempt for life and the values of thrifty, hypocritical “herd”. Also, the “lordlike” pride of looking death straight in the face, aiming toward the Dionysian madness. On the other, Nietzsche tries not to accept the consequences of nihilistic de-revaluating and professes the cult of life and creativity. Not basing them on any axiological foundation he suggests the thesis that a difficult to accept, that the desire of life is something as obvious as hunger of an animal and namely for this reason alone is what should be regarded as absolute and true. This could be summarized in Hegelian manner as follows: Nietzsche glorifies the Lord and also praises the work of the Slave. “Lordliness” of this project lies in unmasking all the truths and preaching the idea of eternal return. The latter concept would be based on the fact that the necessity of the external world is an illusion, because the superman is

³³ In Bielik-Robson, A, (2008), „*Na pustyni*”..., p. 326.

³⁴ Comp. Bielik-Robson, A. (2008) , *Nierówna walka*, [in:] ibidem.

to live only in eternity.³⁵ The "servility" of the superman would appear in the fact that "life is [for them] something as important as pure self-consciousness."³⁶

III. Different reading

It seems that Nietzsche's work needn't even be deconstructed, because paradoxical duality appears in it: the text and margin. They can be called this way only conventionally, because they occupy equal amount of space and it is not known what would be the text and what the margin. It may be that aporias presented by Nietzsche can be reduced to one, variously named, rule. Master and Slave, or eternity and history, or also a "proud" text and the desire of life co-exist, but they cannot reconcile in the synthesis on the grounds of language environment, they do not match each other. For the logic of the text, life, which has no meaning or purpose is irrelevant. The whole metaphysics based on "logocentric" dichotomies treats life-becoming as non-existing, because paradoxically it assigns full existence to what is logically necessary: the fuller the possibility of logic, the fuller must be its existence.³⁷

Nietzsche's whole project is a conflict between its unmasking part and the affirmative one, between "No" and "Yes", which Nietzsche speaks in the face of various manifestations of being, or rather towards various manifestations of becoming. He says "No" to what he found, to metaphysical mental superstitions such as "entity", "object", "good", "evil", "true", "false". He says "Yes" when he asks himself about the person of Nietzsche, as a writer of his work. He says "No" to slavish language creations and the language itself, but he says "Yes" to willingness to write, which is ultimately a manifestation of the will to power, one of the forces that make up Friedrich Nietzsche. So how should Nietzsche's text be transparent if it is to include the thesis that it is the manifestation of the same will to power, which wants to tell us about, when the

³⁵ Comp. Żelazny, M. (2007), *Nietzsche...*, p. 191–205.

³⁶ Hegel, G. W. F. (1997), *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford, p. 220.

³⁷ Comp. Stróżewski, W. (1998), *Krytyka pojęcia nicości w „Ewolucji twórczej” Henryka Bergsona*, [in:] *U progu współczesności. Z dziejów doktryn antypozytywistycznych*, ed. Skarga B., Wrocław.

content of the text is also expressed by the act of writing, which precedes it and thus always destines the content itself to be derivative?

Each excerpt of Nietzsche's work provided with a large quantifier is inconsistent with another part, which describes only some cases. That is every time specific and impossible attempt to overcome the paradox of the liar (a liar when saying "I always lie", falls into the famous paradox, which in humanities could apparently be overcome by adding to the declaration of the liar a sentence: "But sometimes I tell the truth" ³⁸). And so: Nietzsche refutes values, but submits to them calling for changes. Nietzsche denies the existence of free will, but he chooses a way of evaluation. Nietzsche unmasks the value of truth, but he does so in the name of the value of truth itself. ³⁹ Nietzsche is a "liar" who says: "I always lie", but then adds, "and sometimes (right now) I tell the truth", just as if there were two truths: as a verbal expression and as a feeling of the depth of life, which to exist in the consciousness (and a text) must be devoted to the first truth.

Obviously, you can point out Nietzschean contradictions or try to unify the interpretation by "dampening" of some of the aporia's parts, but that is not enough for the philosopher who wants to be honest with what they read (and also to themselves). Since the author of *Will to Power* took the principle of contradiction as assumed duty, and rationality as a product of slavery (herd), then you have to take into account that both showing the aporias and disregarding them do not add much to interpretation of Nietzsche's thought. Such interpretation was already anticipated by Nietzsche, and therefore "precluded" ⁴⁰. Other means than only logical are needed to move closer to his work.

³⁸ Of course I do not mean here the attempts to overcome this paradox by Tarski and Kripke, because, as I have written elsewhere, these ideas are unacceptable in the humanities, comp. Choińska, B., *Paradoks kłamcy w perspektywie hermeneutycznej*, „Przestrzenie Teorii” 11/2009.

³⁹ Pieniążek critically asked, "does not the project of genealogical demystification imply the system of truth that legitimates its claim to cognitive universality?", Pieniążek, P. (1969), *Rozum i szaleństwo...*, p. 9.

⁴⁰ On nietzschean theory of language comp. Moryń, M. (1997), *Wola mocy i myśl. Spotkania z filozofią Fryderyka Nietzschego*, Poznań, p. 46–48.

Pre-structuralist⁴¹ interpretation, which was made by Pierre Klossowski can be characterized as follows: what Nietzsche the unmasker says excludes the possibility of embracing his words in a coherent work, because Nietzsche writes in order to deny the truth he has foreseen. His writing is on the one hand a trail which takes us to the feeling of horror of chaos, on the other, by virtue of its very logocentric nature oriented toward organization, the denial of this truth. In other words, writing “on the one hand is to protect Nietzsche «from forces of inertia», neutralizing the destructive power of urges through their discursive exteriorization or objectification, but on the other, the writing feeds on the obsessive vision of Nietzsche (...) while covering its truth, it also indicates it.”⁴² Klossowski shows this “impossible” situation on the example of a concept of eternal return. The identity of the personal “me” is an element of a “herd” order and opposing it “urges may serve a new me.”⁴³ The eternal wheel symbolizes the primeval, constantly returning chaos. It breaks up the identity, pointing to incidental historicity of a person and also the need for their historicity and temporariness. What occurs when this state of things, having been sensed earlier, begins to be realized by the individual? “[czy tu potrzebny cudzysłów? jeśli tak, to gdzie się otwiera?] The centrifugal forces do not flee the center forever, but approach every now and again, only to retreat from it yet again; such is the nature of the violent fluctuations that shake an individual so long as he sees only his own centre and is incapable of seeing the circle of which he himself is part of. Because if these oscillations shake him, it is because each corresponds to some **other** individual than that which, according to his belief, he is, from the point of view of the centre that cannot be found.”⁴⁴ But does not realizing the idea of eternal return, paradoxically, destroy an individual as such? Not until they have given it permission to do so. The full “Yes” of Nietzsche could not appear in discursive form, when Nietzsche slavishly fought for his own individual life (hence the conflict). Only madness and silence was

⁴¹ Comp. Pieniążek, P. (2006), *Wieczność i nowoczesność. Nietzsche Klossowskiego*, [in:] *O filozofii Fryderyka Nietzschego*, ed. Kozłowski R., Cern K. M., Poznań .

⁴² Ibidem, p. 34.

⁴³ Klossowski, P. (1969), *Nietzsche i błędne koło ...*, p. 87.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 254

absolute consent to the world coming into being. It was the resignation from „me”, affirming the being.

In this context a doubt expressed by Giorgio Colli seems not quite right: “Is it worth showing the importance of Dionysian affirmation of life, madness and games, is it worth opposing them to all abstractions and numbness, all worn and impotent purposefulness, if at the same time we waste life on writing, that is, on comedy, disguise, mask, on something that is not life?”⁴⁵ But this “chaotic” writing (following Lacan it might be called “full”, “non empty”) is not a victory of a text over life. There is only a particular trace of life, like, from Dionysian perspective, it is death.

Nietzschean writing is self-referential. Logically, the contradiction does not refer to something outside it, does not tell us anything binding. It seems that Nietzsche devotes life to writing which in the presence of life is meaningless. On the other hand, this work is, after all, life-writing, a kind of trace of life, and above all a manifestation of the will to power and the fact that Nietzsche says “nothing” does not mean that interpretation of his work is an activity devoid of legitimacy.⁴⁶ Just the opposite, the ambiguity of Nietzscheanism, as well as the tragic biography of the German philosopher, become a challenge for the interpreter.

IV. Conclusion. Nietzsche a hermeneut?

I think the above considerations are in conflict with the frequently today formulated thesis about universality of hermeneutics, which mainly Nietzsche and Heidegger were to patronize (this view is shared, among others, by: Gianni Vattimo, John D. Caputo, and Michał Paweł Markowski). Then this concept becomes so general and vague that actually almost any type of writing can be seen as a kind of hermeneutics. Markowski wrote that common for this writing is “a departure from the theory of knowledge (epistemology) as the parent discipline of philosophy, aiming at

⁴⁵ Colli, G.(1994), *Po Nietzschem...*, p. 107.

⁴⁶ Thus, the argument by Bielik-Robson is not convincing: “Perhaps it would be appropriate to drain the merciful veil of silence on problems of <<theoretical>>nature, which are implied by this diagnosis — the problems that Nietzsche (...) left their subsequent faithful readers, as well as he tied for <<natural criteria>>”, Bielik-Robson, A. (2008) , *Na pustyni...*, p. 324.

methodical securing of one's research results (which are claimed to be adequate in relation to their subject), and imposing them on others in the form of absolute validity." ⁴⁷ However, the situation, which does not lead us to a final understanding, may be treated differently, depending on what position we adopt on language and cultural tradition. Not only that, this approach is changing due to our emotional (Nietzsche would say "physiological") expectations (reasonably moderate or enormous epistemological claims) associated with the phenomenon of language. ⁴⁸ Taking into consideration that language for Hans G. Gadamer is somehow synonymous with reality and existence with meaning, but for Nietzsche it is something other than the primary chaos (it is one of the "creations" of this element, distorting its "real", irrational nature) it seems difficult to agree that these two approaches bear the common name of "hermeneutics". Andrzej Przyłębski wrote: "Language, producing a semblance of truth about reality, disturbs him [Nietzsche] more, separating from the directly lived reality, than it is a typically positive condition of the human being-in-world." ⁴⁹

It is therefore natural that, if Nietzsche is considered the patron of post-structuralism, neither Wilhelm Dilthey, Heidegger nor Gadamer felt the climate of nietzschean hermeneutics, but only a certain, convenient for them inspiration. Nevertheless, whether Nietzscheanism makes "fateful simplification of the human being-in-the-world" ⁵⁰ or otherwise, it is a heroic project opposing all "philistine" ⁵¹ half-measures, purposefully sacrificing history for eternity, that is another issue which, for objective reasons, cannot be discussed in this article.

⁴⁷ Markowski, M. P., *Nietzsche i hermeneutyka*, „Teksty Drugie” 1/1996, p. 24.

⁴⁸ Comp. Choińska, B. (2009), *Dekonstrukcja i hermeneutyka*, [in:] *Hermeneutyczna tradycja filozofii*, red. Mikołajczyk H. T., Rembierz M., Słupsk.

⁴⁹ Przyłębski, A. (2006), *Nietzsche i hermeneutyka*, [in:] *O filozofii Fryderyka Nietzschego...*, p. 27.

⁵⁰ Ibidem.

⁵¹ Comp. Nietzsche, F. (1996), *Niewczesne rozważania*, trans. Łukasiewicz M., Kraków, p. 14.